Download e-book for kindle: A Philosophical Companion to First-Order Logic by R. I. G. Hughes

By R. I. G. Hughes

ISBN-10: 0872201821

ISBN-13: 9780872201828

This quantity of contemporary writings, a few formerly unpublished, follows the series of a standard intermediate or upper-level common sense direction and permits lecturers to counterpoint their shows of formal tools and effects with readings on corresponding questions in philosophical good judgment.

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Do Conditionals Have Truth-Conditions? 49 affairs identified obtains. For him, the argument shows that there are no conditional states of affairs. For an anti-realist who construes truth along the lines of what is ideally rationally acceptable, it is much more puzzling that the notion cannot be applied to conditionals. But, as I said before, the argument itself makes no assumptions about the nature of truth. 12 12. Earlier versions of this essay were read to the Oxford Philosophical Society in 1984 and the Conference on the Philosophy of Logic and Language in Leicester, 1985.

It is self-evident that N is not a truth-function of A when A is true. But it does not follow that one may be sure that A yet agnostic about whether it is self-evident that A. For there is no room for uncertainty about propositions of this last form. However, such an operator clearly contrasts with the operators, 'if, 'before', 'because', which, in general, make contingent a posteriori claims, about which there is plenty of room for uncertainty. Of course there are self-evident conditionals, such as 'If he's a bachelor, he's unmarried'; but they owe their selfevidence to the particular contents of the constituent propositions.

And the inference appears very plausible. We shall see how to explain these facts. 4 -A B r-- A AvB -B If I am agnostic about A, and agnostic about B, but confident that A or B, I must believe that if not-A, B. (See Figure 4. If in almost all 8. See Adams (1975), ch. 1. 4I Do Conditionals Have Truth-Conditions? ) This is the normal situation in which a belief that A or B will play an active role in my mind, as a premiss or as anything else, for example, someone has told me that A or B, or I have eliminated all but these two possibilities.

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A Philosophical Companion to First-Order Logic by R. I. G. Hughes

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